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consequences when learning a complex computer
task
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CATHY VAN DYCK
Work and Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The
Netherlands; e-mail: ao_linden@macmail.psy.uva.nl
Abstract. When trying to learn a complex task, people can use
diŒerent strategies. They can use systematic exploration in
which they take on an active approach to discover the computer
functions and make use of problem solving steps such as
planning, evaluation of feedback, and control of emotion and
motivation. Alternatively, they can use non-systematic strate-
gies like trial-and-error, rigid exploration, and encapsulation in
information seeking. This study examined whether the
exploration strategies were related to error consequences and
performance when people learned a new computer program.
Strategies were assessed by means of coding. Analysis showed
strong correlations between strategies, error consequences, and
task performance. These results can have implications for
training design and human reliability in dealing with complex
devices.
1. Introduction
Due to the progress in technology, the nature of work
is changing. The large amount of automation in industry
has made work more complex. Often, employees are
expected to work in complex environments in which
they have to search for information and make the right
decisions. Performance on such tasks depends on the
quality of the exploration strategies that are used.
Therefore, there is a growing interest in complex
problem solving research and in the modelling of
strategies during problem solving or learning (van der
Schaaf 1993). Exploration strategies during complex
problems can be considered either optimal or sub-
optimal. Sub-optimal strategies are, for instance, asso-
ciated with lack of planning and feedback evaluation.
Studies of DoÈ rner and co-workers (e.g. DoÈ rner and
Schaub 1994, DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995) showed how
sub-optimal strategies led to poor performance in
diŒerent computer simulations: Participants who used
sub-optimal strategies had less insight into the system or
were less able to control the system. The simulations in
these studies were all complex dynamic tasks. However,
the quality of exploration strategies is also important in
learning computer applications or other complex
devices. For instance, Trudel and Payne (1996) found
that people who used re¯ ective exploration strategies
learned more of the functions of a digital stopwatch
compared to people who used less re¯ ective strategies.
This paper examines the diŒerent strategies people use
when learning a complex computer task. In the
following sections we will ® rst describe some of the
exploration strategies used during complex problem
solving. Then we will illustrate how such strategies
might be related to performance and error conse-
quences.
1.1. Problem solving strategies
Studies in the area of complex problem solving and
human reliability have concentrated on describing
diŒerent strategies people use when solving complex
problems. For instance, DoÈ rner and Schaub (1994)
diŒerentiated between optimal strategies such as sys-
tematic exploration, and sub-optimal strategies such as
trial-and-error, rigid exploration (which they called
dogmatic entrenchment), and encapsulation in informa-
tion seeking.
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Systematic exploration is an optimal pattern of
behaviour that leads to the highest probability of
successful task completion (Hollnagel 1993a, DoÈ rner
and Schaub 1994). The term s̀ystematic’ refers to the
process in which a person forms goals and intentions
based on hypotheses about how the task should be done.
These hypotheses are tested in a logical manner and
their outcomes are evaluated in order to plan further
behaviour.
Systematic exploration does not only go hand in hand
with the adequate co-ordination of problem solving
steps but also with a high level of motivational and
emotional control (DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995). The
processes responsible for this are referred to as self-
regulatory processes (Muraven et al. 1998). When
solving complex tasks, there is a constant risk of making
errors and of information overload. This can lead to
high levels of arousal and to a subsequent decrease in
performance. Motivational and emotional self-regula-
tion has to deal with this arousal and has to make sure
that most cognitive resources stay invested in the task
instead of in the intrusive negative cognitions resulting
from errors (Frese 1995).
The trial-and-error strategy is assumed to be either
less eŒective or less e cient (Hollnagel 1993a, DoÈ rner
and Wearing 1995). Crucial for this strategy is a lack of
hypotheses to direct behaviour. Trial-and-error resem-
bles the concept of the scrambled mode described by
Hollnagel (1993a: 168) in which `the choice of the next
action is completely unpredictable or random’.
Several possible causes can lead to the use of trial-
and-error approaches. Lack of knowledge about a
particular problem domain is one of these causes.
Without a minimum amount of knowledge, it is very
di cult to plan or to get an idea where to search for
answers. In such a situation, trial-and-error is the only
thing one can do. Another possible cause is perceived
loss of control over the task. A high level of perceived
loss of control, without a high level of self-regulation
can easily lead to the negative eŒects of cognitive
intrusions and negative emotions we referred to earlier.
The result will be that less planning and feedback
evaluation will be done and trial-and-error behaviour
will be displayed.
One type of behaviour that often can be observed
during problem solving is rigid exploration (Reason
1990, Hollnagel 1993a, DoÈ rner and Schaub 1994).
This type of behaviour is characterized by the
repetitive nature of action sequences. People working
in a rigid way hold on to certain hypotheses for a long
time, even if evidence is accumulating that the
hypotheses are wrong. Rigid exploration is closely
related to con® rmation bias (Nisbett and Ross 1980).
If the problem space is too large for complete
exploration or if time is limited, then actions will be
guided by the hypothesis that has the highest
perceived probability of leading to a solution. Once
eŒort is invested in testing a particular hypothesis, the
tendency to search for con® rming evidence increases.
The processing of discon® rming evidence, on the other
hand, decreases (DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995). Rigid
exploration might be a direct result of declined self-
monitoring during problem solving. Self-monitoring
can be considered a meta-cognitive process by which
people re¯ ect on their own strategies. If self-monitor-
ing is low, people will not notice their tendencies to
repeatedly perform the same action sequence without
success.
Another type of behaviour one can show when trying
to solve a complex problem is encapsulation in
information seeking. If one is not able to solve the
problem, it can be useful to search for more informa-
tion. There is, however, a possibility that the newly
acquired knowledge will lead to more questions and
more uncertainty. This will result in more information
seeking. In the end, the gathering of information
becomes the main goal. Consequences of excessive
information seeking will be that decisions and actions
will either be postponed or will not be taken at all. Thus,
task performance will suŒer. In literature, the negative
impact of encapsulation in information seeking on
performance has mainly been described in relation to
complex dynamic tasks (e.g. emergency situations) (e.g.
Funke 1991, DoÈ rner and Schaub 1994, DoÈ rner and
Wearing 1995). However, it is likely that any other task,
in which decisions have to be made within a limited
amount of time, will also suŒer from encapsulation
(although the authors leave open the possibility that
encapsulation might enhance performance on transfer
tasks because the people using `encapsulation ’ strategies
should have required more declarative knowledge in
initial tasks).
Until now, we described several exploration strategies
people can use during complex tasks. We also argued
that the choice of a particular exploration strategy
sometimes depends on cognitions about ones inability to
accomplish the task (loss of control). Such cognitions
might be considered as negative self-evaluations that are
accompanied with lower levels of self-e cacy (Bandura
1997). Negative self-evaluations might also be related to
low performance and sub-optimal strategies because
when people are giving attentional resources to negative
cognitions then less of those resources would be
available for working on the main task (Kanfer and
Ackerman 1989, Mikulincer 1989). Therefore, we also
looked at to which extent the participants of our study
got involved in negative evaluations about their own
performance and capability.
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1.2. Consequences of strategy use
Whenever people use non-systematic strategies, they
will often make many errors (Hollnagel 1993a, DoÈ rner
and Wearing 1995). In safe environments such as
training sessions, making many errors is not necessarily
dysfunctional as long as one is able to learn from them.
However, the problem is that using non-systematic
strategies leads to a lower degree of learning (Shrager
and Klahr 1986). To learn from an error it is necessary
to process the information that the error can provide.
Furthermore, an error can lead to negative cognitions
and emotions that have to be dealt with in order to
prevent a breakdown of skills during the rest of the task
(Davis 1948). From our descriptions of systematic
versus non-systematic exploration strategies it follows
that both the processing of information and the
regulation of cognition and emotion are parts of
systematic exploration and are almost lacking in non-
systematic strategies. Thus, we can argue that non-
systematic strategies reduce the amount of learning.
It is expected that the diŒerent strategies will be
directly related to task performance: In our study,
performance is the number of sub-tasks participants
learn to solve with a computer program. We expect that
systematic exploration will be positively related to
performance (which would be displayed by a positive
relationship between systematic exploration and number
of tasks solved). For non-systematic strategies the
relationship with performance is expected to be negative
(Hypothesis 1).
1.3. Error consequences
Strategies might not only be related to diŒerences in
learning performance but also to diŒerences in the
number and type of errors. In this section, we
concentrate on this relationship between strategies,
errors, and error consequences in complex tasks. The
literature on human error distinguishes between the
error itself and the consequence of the error (Hollnagel
1993b, Frese 1995). It is not the error per se that has a
large impact on further behaviour. What matters most
are the error consequences. This is a major point in the
concept of error management. Frese (1995) suggested
that errors are omnipresent in human behaviour.
Therefore, one should not only concentrate on the
prevention of errors but also on the prevention of
negative error consequences (Frese and Zapf 1991).
Error consequences might play a major role in the
relationship between strategy-use and performance.
Under certain conditions, errors could cause shifts in
strategy-use, for example, in a situation in which an
error is made that has a serious negative impact on goal
attainment. Such error has the potential to cause
frustration, which might rise to such a level that a
person might switch from systematic strategies (if that
was the strategy that that person was initially using) to
non-systematic strategies. On the other hand, it is also
possible that someone makes an error (e.g. takes a
wrong turn, presses a wrong button) that accidentally
leads closer to the intended goal. Such an event would
have a direct positive eŒect on performance as well as a
positive in¯ uence on mood and possibly also on feelings
of self-esteem, which are important for complex
problem solving (DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995).
If many things go wrong and people feel that they are
losing control over the task it might also happen that
feelings of panic and time pressure emerge. According to
Davis (1948: 22) this happens when people s̀hould fail
to reach the standard of performance which represents
success to them’. Such events cause disorganization in
subsequent behaviour resulting in more errors. Again, it
is assumed that this disorganization is caused by
impaired self-regulation Ð or stated diŒerently, impaired
resistance against negative intrusive thoughts. There-
fore, we expect a strong relationship between errors
during a task and the number of negative self-evalua-
tions (Hypothesis 2).
Loss of control during a task often goes together with
bursts of activism. During this state of activism one will
act often and rapidly but in a way that is not very useful
for goal attainment (non-systemati c strategies). This
behavioural syndrome resembles the concept of what
DoÈ rner and Wearing (1995) called the emergency
reaction. A possible explanation for this kind of reaction
is that it is a demonstration (to oneself or to the `outer
world’) that one is still in control and that one is doing
something. This gives at least the illusion of competence
(although this behaviour might actually worsen the
situation).
Based on the separation between the error itself and
the error consequence it is useful to diŒerentiate between
three types of error consequences. First, negative
consequences for direct goal attainment (e.g. errors that
block further eŒective behaviour or errors that destroy
earlier constructive work). Second, non-eŒective actions:
erroneous actions that do not have any direct eŒect at all
(e.g. pushing non-active buttons or other worthless
attempts). Finally, actions which are in essence wrong
(do not lead to the intended goal) but might lead to
insight in solving the task one is working on (positive
error consequence).
With regard to strategies one might expect that a trial-
and-error strategy in which things are tried out in a
disorganized way is related to more negative error
consequences and more non-eŒective actions (Hypoth-
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esis 3). Strategies such as rigid exploration and
encapsulation in information seeking can be associated
with low levels of risk taking. Keeping stuck to pre-
formed ideas or excessively gathering information with-
out acting a lot will not lead to much progress during the
task and it also prevents one from trying out the
unknown area within the problem space. Thus we
hypothesize that rigid exploration and encapsulation in
information seeking will not be correlated with amount
of negative error consequences (Hypothesis 4).
To make the hypotheses from the introduction more
explicit we present the expected relationships between
the strategy variables on the one hand and performance
and error variables on the other hand in table 1. In this
table a `+ ’ denotes that we expected a positive
relationship, ` Ð ’ denotes an expected negative relation-
ship, and `0’ means we expected no relationship.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Nineteen ® rst-year psychology students participated in
this study. They received extra study credits for
participation. Fourteen participants were female and
® ve were male. Average age was M = 21.6 years
(SD = 5.5). Study participants diŒered in the amount
of pre-knowledge on computers (see section 2.4 on
computer knowledge). We were aware of the relatively
small sample size. The analyses we did, were however
quite detailed in nature and concentrated mainly on the
processes during the task. Furthermore, other studies
have shown that analysing such a sample can provide
insight into the process of exploratory learning (Schrager
and Klahr 1986, Chi et al. 1989, Trudel and Payne 1996).
2.2. Task
We used a task with the spreadsheet computer
program Excel (version 4.0 for Macintosh). This task
consisted of changing the format of a table, which
included moving text, adding rows and changing colours
and borders. Participants worked on this task within an
error-training framework. Error training is a training
method in which participants have to work on a task
with a minimum amount of information provided and in
which they are encouraged to learn from errors (Frese
1995). During such task, one can observe almost all of
the systematic and non-systematic strategies.
Participants had to discover most of the features of the
program themselves by means of exploration. Because
none of the participants had any experience with Excel it
was inevitable that they made errors. The task turned out
to be very di cult for most of the participants.
2.3. Procedure
Before the participants worked on the task they had
to ® ll out the questionnaire on the control variable
(computer experience). Then they worked on a short
introductory Excel task for ® ve minutes. With this
introductory task they could get used to the experi-
mental setting and the thinking aloud method. After the
introductory task, participants worked on the format-
ting task. They were given the table formatting assign-
ment, but no instructions on how to do it. They were
told to work on the task for half an hour. Participants
got the instruction that they did not necessarily have to
® nish the entire task within the time but they at least had
to try to come `as far as possible’ .
During the task, the experimenter sat out of sight of
the participants and observed them. Participants were
told to keep on talking aloud when they stayed quiet for
longer than ® ve seconds, the experimenter used the
standard sentence `keep talking please’ , to avoid
prompting (Ericsson and Simon 1993). During the task,
the computer screen the participants worked on was
directly connected to a Video recorder (VCR). Every
action on the screen was recorded. A small microphone
above the screen, which was also connected to the same
VCR, recorded the verbalizations.
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Table 1. Expected relationships between strategies, performance and error consequences.
Positive error Negative error
Performance consequences consequences Non-eŒective actions
Systematic exploration + + Ð Ð
Trial-and-error Ð Ð + +
Rigid exploration Ð Ð 0 +
Encapsulation Ð Ð 0 0
Negative self-evaluations Ð Ð + +
2.4. Measures
2.4.1. Performance and strategies: We categorized
participants’ strategies by coding their behaviour based
on the video recordings. Such a method is often used in
error analysis and problem solving research and has
shown to be valid and reliable (Hollnagel et al. 1981,
Frese and Zapf 1991).
2.4.2. Performance: Within the Excel task, we diŒer-
entiated between several sub-tasks, such as border
thickening and colour changing. The whole Excel task
consisted of eight sub-tasks. Performance was operatio-
nalized as the number of sub-tasks solved.
2.4.3. Strategy-use: As coding units for strategy as-
sessment, we used actions such as pushing a button in
the toolbar or handling a menu. These units were the
smallest meaningful actions in our experimental task.
Thus, every time a participant pressed a button in the
toolbar or opened a menu-option in the menu bar, the
raters assessed whether this was done in a systematic or
non-systematic way. Furthermore, every time such
handling of a button or menu-option led to an error,
the raters assessed its consequence. Additional coding
was done for statements of negative self-evaluation
(frequency of occurrence).
It turned out that most of the participants used
several strategies during the task. For example, it could
be observed that someone worked in a trial-and-error
manner for most of the time, but occasionally used
systematic exploration. The frequency with which the
participants used a certain strategy was what diŒer-
entiated between them. For the statistical analysis of the
strategies and error consequences we used proportions.
These proportions were calculated by dividingÐ for each
participantÐ the number of actions in a category by the
total number of actions of that same participant. Thus,
for example if a participant performed 30 actions during
the task of which 10 led to negative consequences, this
participant would have a proportion of 0.33 for this
category.
A second independent rater coded eleven of the
nineteen videotapes. For every strategy- and error-
consequence category, we computed Pearson correla-
tions between the two raters. Descriptions and some
examples of the strategies and error consequences that
were coded, as well as interrater correlations are given in
table 2. Note that strategies such as systematic explora-
tion cannot be operationalised by standard forms of
behaviour such as depth-® rst or breadth- ® rst strategies
(Norman 1991). A menu or button-handling event of a
participant was rated systematic if there were signs that
this event handling was part of an intentional plan or
was evaluated. Events such as saving intermediate
results or using the undo-button to undo previous
errors were for instance rated as systematic. However,
due to the complexity of the task and many diŒerent
types of behaviour that can occur on such task it would
go too far to list all speci® c events that were associated
with systematic or unsystematic strategies.
2.4.4. Computer knowledge and general intelligen-
ce: We expected that individuals diŒer on general
computer experience and that this variable might have
an impact on performance. For instance, knowledge
about features that are shared by a wide range of
diŒerent computer programs might lead to clear
advantages on the task. Although experience might
in¯ uence the way of working of the participants, in this
study we were interested in the theoretical relationships
between exploration strategies and performance and
error consequences. For this reason we included
measurements of general computer experience in our
study and used it as a control variable. It could also be
possible that general intelligence is related to task
performance although we expected that within the
restricted range of intelligence that is found in our
participants (all were university students), eŒects of
intelligence diŒerences might be overruled by computer
experience. Nevertheless, we also include intelligence
measures in our study as an additional control variable.
2.4.5. Computer knowledge: Computer knowledge was
assessed with seven questions (5-point Likert scales)
concerning participants’ experience with operating
systems, and the use of other applications (Reliability
a = 0.75). Response categories ranged from `never’
( = 1) to `very often’ ( = 5). This measure showed that
14 participants had never or seldom worked with a
Macintosh computer (score of 1 or 2). Four participants
had worked often with a Macintosh computer (score 4
or 5). Most participants were familiar with the Windows
Operating System (approximately 60% had a score of 4
or 5).
2.4.6. Intelligence: Intelligence was measured with a
test that was based on the intelligence model of Guilford
(1967). The test consists of six sub-test such as reason-
ing, perceptual speed, verbal and numerical aptitude. All
sub-test are based on established aptitude tests and have
high reliability (M = 0.83, range: 0.80 to 0.85) (see, for
example, Elshout and Veenman 1992). We used the
scores on the sub-tests to construct a single score that
represented general intelligence. Intelligence was mea-
sured before our study during a mandatory period in
which all ® rst year students had to participate.
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3. Results
Before testing the hypotheses, we analysed whether
intelligence and computer knowledge were related to
performance. As expected, intelligence was not related
to performance on the computer tasks. However,
computer knowledge was substantially related to task
performance (r = 0.40, p = 0.01). To examine the eŒects
of strategies on performance beyond the eŒects of
computer knowledge, we controlled for computer
knowledge in all further analyses.
Table 3 presents the average proportions of strategy-
use plus the range. Thus the proportion of 0.51 in this
table implies that on average about 50% of the actions
made were rated as being a part of systematic
exploration. Although there were sometimes substantial
individual diŒerences, all the participants had a score
greater than zero for systematic exploration, trial-and-
error, and rigid exploration Encapsulation was the least
frequent kind of behaviour that occurred. Approxi-
mately 50% of the participants never showed this
behaviour at all. For the error consequence categories,
`positive consequences’ was the least occurring event.
Approximately 20% of the participants did not have
any errors with positive consequences. An average of
33% of all actions did not lead to errors. The intended
goal was reached in these actions (e.g. making a text
bold).
3.1. Strategies and performance
Analysis showed that systematic exploration was
positively related to task performance (see table 4) and
that rigid exploration and encapsulation were nega-
tively related to performance. Trial-and-error strategy
and negative self-evaluations were not signi® cantly
related to performance although there was a negative
trend.
3.2. Error consequences and performance
Analysis further showed that error consequences were
related to performance. Errors with positive conse-
quences were positively related with performance. Non-
eŒective actions and errors with negative consequences
were negatively related to performance. The two
correlations did not reach signi® cance although they
were in the expected direction.
3.3. Strategies and error consequences
It turned out that the quality of strategy-use was
strongly related to the types of error consequence (table
4). Systematic exploration was negatively correlated to
negative error consequences and non-eŒective actions.
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Table 2. Category descriptions, examples and interrater correlations.
Category Description Examples r
Systematic Exploring the system in a re¯ ective manner: - Considering a menu-option due to its name 0.74
exploration testing hypotheses, planning, and evaluation (e.g. border).
of action outcomes - Analysing a menu-option accompanied with
statements that suggest the processing of
information available in that option.
Trial-and-error Exploring the system without displaying signs - Randomly pushing buttons or menu-options 0.87
of hypotheses testing, planning, or evaluation. without sense of direction.
Rigid exploration Repetitions of ineŒective actions (more than - Keep on trying the option colour palette 0.97
twice), or holding on to faulty ideas longer than (more than twice) to colour a section without
`objectively’ necessary. (any) eŒect.
Encapsulation in Excessive search for information - Staying in the help-menu for a long time and 0.93
information seeking reading every bit of information carefully,
irrespective of its use.
Negative Statements that re¯ ect perceived loss of control - `I really cannot do this task’ . 0.77
self-evaluations of the task - `I have absolutely no idea what to do
anymore’.
Positive error Erroneous actions that did not lead to the - Accidentally changing the colours of a 0.93
consequences intended goal but that provide obvious useful proportion of the table when trying to
information about the task. thicken the border.
Negative error Erroneous actions that led to consequences that - Deleting previous work. 0.75
consequences had a direct negative eŒect on goal attainment.
Non-eŒective Actions that did not have any consequences. - Pressing an inactive button 0.83
actions
Systematic exploration was positively correlated with
positive error consequences, which can be considered as
events that often lead the participant to a solution. In
contrast, the trial-and-error strategy was positively
correlated with negative error consequences and non-
eŒective actions and negatively correlated with positive
error consequences (although not signi® cantly). Rigid
exploration and encapsulation in information seeking
both were negatively correlated with positive error
consequences. There were no signi® cant relationships
between these non-systematic strategies and negative
error consequences.
Negative self-evaluations correlated negatively with
positive error consequences and positively with negative
error consequences and non-eŒective actions. Notable is
the very high correlation we found between the total
number of actions and negative self-evaluations
(r = 0.70, p < 0.01 for the correlations corrected for
computer knowledge and r = 0.93, p < 0.01 for the
simple correlations). This can be an indication of an
emergency reaction (DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995) from
the participants who performed poorly.
4. Discussion
Our study con® rmed our hypothesis that the use of
systematic exploration was related to better task
performance (Hypothesis 1). Participants who mainly
used systematic exploration formed hypotheses about
the system. This indicated deliberate eŒorts in trying to
understand the system they were working on. They also
tested these hypotheses and evaluated the outcomes of
such tests in order to direct further behaviour, which
suggests a higher level of planning. Moreover, they
re¯ ected more on their own actions and changed their
ways of working if necessary. By using this kind of
exploration they learned more about the functions of the
Exploration, performance and error consequences 195
Table 3. Participants’ mean proportions, standard deviations, percentiles, and highest and lowest values for strategy-use and error
consequences (n = 19).
M SD 25th percentile 75th percentile Lowest value Highest value
Strategies
Systematic exploration 0.51 0.18 0.36 0.70 0.19 0.85
Trial-and-error 0.19 0.17 0.05 0.24 0.03 0.47
Rigid exploration 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.43
Encapsulation 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25
Error consequences
Positive error consequences 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.21
Negative error consequences 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.25 0.05 0.40
Non-eŒective actions 0.44 0.11 0.38 0.51 0.31 0.67
Actions not leading to errors 0.33 0.14 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.48
Note: Proportions for strategies do not add up to 100% because not all actions that were coded could be indexed into one of the
categories (rest category for strategies was 13% , there were no correlations with other study variables).
Table 4. Intercorrelation matrix strategies, error consequences, and task performance (n = 19).
M
a
SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Systematic 21.84 7.5 ± Ð 0.62** Ð 0.60** Ð 0.57* Ð 0.49* 0.73** Ð 0.51* Ð 0.71** 0.59** Ð 0.45
2. Trial-and-error 8.11 7.3 Ð 0.63** ± Ð 0.09 0.05 0.37 Ð 0.39 0.62* 0.56* Ð 0.23 0.41
3. Rigid exploration 7.26 5.0 Ð 0.65** Ð 0.02 ± 0.61* 0.09 Ð 0.56* Ð 0.13 0.29 Ð 0.52* 0.02
4. Encapsulation 1.42 2.2 Ð 0.60* 0.11 0.60* ± 0.02 Ð 0.47* Ð 0.19 0.14 Ð 0.60** Ð 0.15
5. Negative evaluation 2.72 3.2 Ð 0.59* 0.52* 0.03 Ð 0.01 ± Ð 0.57* 0.41 0.80** Ð 0.29 0.70**
6. Positive
consequence error
2.17 1.9 0.77** Ð 0.37 Ð 0.61* Ð 0.51* Ð 0.56* ± Ð 0.42 Ð 0.81** 0.65** 0.60*
7. Negative
consequence error
7.44 4.6 Ð 0.51* 0.61* 0.17 Ð 0.18 0.43** Ð 0.37 ± 0.51* Ð 0.29 0.52*
8. Non eŒective action 18.83 6.5 Ð 0.73** 0.56* 0.32 0.16 0.85** 0.79** 0.48 ± Ð 0.40 0.85**
9. Task performance
b
3.50 2.6 0.68** Ð 0.09 Ð 0.68** Ð 0.77** Ð 0.24 0.60* Ð 0.33 Ð 0.22 ± Ð 0.02
10. Number of actions 42.47 12.9 Ð 0.45 0.44 0.05 Ð 0.14 0.93** 0.75** 0.95** 0.60* Ð 0.13 ±
Note: Correlations above the diagonal are zero-order correlations. Correlations below the diagonal are the partial correlations
(controlled for general computer knowledge).
a
Means denote the averages of the participants.
b
Range 0 ± 8. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
program and were thus better equipped to deal with the
complex problem.
The pattern of error consequences related to using
systematic exploration (more positive errors, less nega-
tive errors) con® rmed our expectation that, in terms of
human reliability, systematic exploration is the most
desired kind of behaviour to show when facing complex
problems. Furthermore, the results showed that it is
useful to focus on speci® c error consequences in error
analysis instead of strictly rating errors as not reaching
the goal that preceded the act.
In contrast to our expectation (the second part of
Hypothesis 1), trial-and-error did not have a signi® cant
negative impact on task performance. Apparently, by
trying out diŒerent things with trial-and-error one can
probably still detect many of the computer functions
needed to solve a task. However, trial and error
behaviour was associated with more errors with negative
consequences and non-eŒective actions (Hypothesis 3).
Thus, there are costs of using a trial-and-error strategy.
Rigid exploration and encapsulation in information
seeking both showed similar patterns with regard to
performance and error consequences. Use of these
strategies was associated with low performance (Hy-
pothesis 1) and a low amount of errors with positive
consequences. More rigidity during exploration or
encapsulation in information seeking did however not
go together with more errors with negative consequences
or ineŒective actions. This was in accordance with our
hypothesis (Hypothesis 4).
Observations during the study showed that partici-
pants who got engaged in rigid exploration seemed to be
driven by salient information that was available in the
program (e.g. menu names or pictograms on buttons).
Furthermore, these observations showed that even after
several ineŒective attempts they held on to this salient
information and were reluctant to explore new possibi-
lities, maybe due to uncertainty or to lack of further
ideas. These observations have implications for system
design because it suggests that under certain circum-
stances, inadequate menu naming (or button picto-
grams) can yield rigidity. For instance the use of the
terms of background and foreground under the format-
option: in attempts to change the colour of the Excel-
cells, many participants tried out the option back-
ground, which initially looked like the right option.
Rigid participants either took very long switching to the
counter-intuitive option foreground (which actually was
the right option), or did not try this option at all (and
subsequently failed to solve that particular sub-task).
It is obvious how such rigidity can lead to low
performance: if one does not try out diŒerent possibi-
lities fewer options will be discovered. Furthermore, one
can imagine that limited exploration also does not lead
to many errors because fewer di culties will be
encountered.
Similar arguments can be used for the relationships
between encapsulation on the one hand and errors and
performance on the other hand. During encapsulation,
participants spent a lot of time gathering all kinds of
information without acting a lot. According to the
literature, this behaviour occurs if people are over-
whelmed by the complexity of the task (DoÈ rner and
Scholkopf 1991, DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995). People who
become encapsulated in information seeking do not wish
to take much risk, hence they will not make many
errors. The downside of this behaviour is that encapsu-
lation is a relatively passive state while exploration
requires an active pursuit for solutions. Therefore, one
will not discover much of the program’s functions and
subsequently show low performance.
Low performance, many errors with negative con-
sequences, and many non-eŒective actions also went
together with negative self-evaluations (Hypothesis 2).
Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study we cannot
draw any causal conclusion. Nevertheless, observation
during the study suggested that negative self-evaluations
often occurred after experiencing negative error con-
sequences or after relatively long series of non-eŒective
actions. It seemed as if negative self-evaluations were a
reaction to things that went wrong during the task. The
high correlation between negative self-evaluations and
the total number of actions is noteworthy (table 4). We
believe that this relationship between number of
negative self-evaluations and number of actions re¯ ects
the emergency reaction in which one starts getting
extremely activated and tries out many things which
might not be very eŒective or useful (DoÈ rner and
Wearing 1995). However, this behaviour gives the
person the sense of doing something, thus protecting
the person’s self-esteem that is essential for solving
complex problems.
If lack of success is indeed an important factor
contributing to the emergency reaction, then one can
imagine that achieving some intermediary success
should make it possible to escape from the emergency
reaction. This is in accordance with ® ndings of
Hollnagel (1993a: 188) who reported that `a continued
series of failures is likely to reduce subjectively available
time and make the situation more tense while a
continuous series of successes is likely to improve the
situation in every way’ .
4.1. Implications for further research
The strategy-classi ® cations used in this study were
mainly based on theories on complex problem solving
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(CPS) from DoÈ rner and co-workers (e.g. DoÈ rner and
Schaub 1994, DoÈ rner and Wearing 1995). Most of the
research on this has been done with computer simula-
tions of complex tasks such as ® re ® ghting or controlling
a city (Funke 1991). In the present study we applied this
particular theory of complex problem solving to human-
computer interaction with an existing software program
(Excel) and showed that the impact of strategies derived
from CPS-theory can be generalised to this area.
Further studies might be done to ® nd out how
strategies and performance change during the period
of working on the task. For instance, it might be of
interest to ® nd out whether negative error consequences
and success can indeed lead to shifts in strategy-use .
Besides this it might be illuminating to more speci® cally
look at the individual steps of the action process of
which we assumed to underlie the strategies we studied.
This might show that diŒerences in strategy-use mainly
re¯ ect self-regulatory processes. Such processes are
assumed to be of major importance for regulating self-
motivation and negative emotions. Furthermore, several
authors have proposed that self-regulation is the
mechanism with which a person allocates attentional
resources and co-ordinates diŒerent cognitive steps in
the problem solving process (such as planning) (Kanfer
and Ackerman 1989, Farr et al. 1993, Frese and Zapf
1994). The idea of a single construct underlying
strategies is supported by the high inter-correlations
between the strategies (see table 4). Further studies
might be done that put more emphasis on the relation-
ship between self-regulation and problem-solving stra-
tegies.
4.2. Consequences for practice
Because of the increase of technical interactive devices
around us and the increase in complexity of our
environment, it is important to know how people try
to get insight into complex situations by means of
exploration. We showed how people can use diŒerent
strategies during such exploration and how these
strategies relate to error consequences and performance.
For training purposes this kind of information can be
used to create speci® c instructions that will guide a
trainee to adopt more systematic, and fewer non-
systematic strategies. For instance, by providing trainees
with abstract information about steps that have to be
taken during problem solving. Such instructions should
stress the importance of action sequences in which one
tries to come up with hypothesis, make plans to test
these hypotheses, and evaluate their outcomes. Further-
more, such instructions should also stress the impor-
tance of active control of emotions and motivation by
keeping attention focused on the task instead of on
intrusive negative thoughts.
Information about exploration strategies might not
only be useful for training purposes but also for the
analysis of human reliability. The use of trial-and-error
during critical situations in high-risk industries can lead
to disastrous outcomes. Rigidity can lead to operators
spending much precious time on faulty options before
they become aware that they are on the wrong track.
For developing procedures to enhance the safety of
human behaviour it is necessary that future research
identi® es the diŒerent types of strategies during complex
tasks including their causes and their consequences.
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